Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options by Joseph R. Blasi et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and 
Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options  
Volume Author/Editor: Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman and Joseph R. 
Blasi, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-05695-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/krus08-1
Conference Dates: October 6-7, 2006
Publication Date: April 2010
Chapter Title:  Epilogue (and Prologue)
Chapter Author:  Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, Richard B. Freeman  
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11827
Chapter pages in book: (377 - 386)377
Epilogue (and Prologue)
Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and 
Richard B. Freeman
At this writing the US model of capitalism faces great problems. The implo-
sion of Wall Street due to excessive leverage, inadequate regulations, and 
poor incentives and ﬁ  nancial contracts that induced many at the top of the 
ﬁ  nancial hierarchy to undertake highly risky investments, has produced the 
greatest economic decline since the Great Depression. Many see the US 
economic model as driven by Wall Street ﬁ  nance that has failed to deliver the 
goods. This book has studied a diﬀerent part of the American model—one 
that has received less attention but has proven far more successful. Shared 
capitalism has long been of interest for its potential to aﬀect workplace pro-
ductivity, employee- management relations, quality of work life, job security, 
worker pay, the distribution of wealth, and broader participation in the eco-
nomic system. In exhibit 1 in the introduction we listed six key “take-  away” 
ﬁ  ndings from our research:
1.  Shared capitalism is a signiﬁ  cant part of the US economic model.
2.  Worker co-  monitoring helps shared capitalist ﬁ  rms overcome incen-
tives to free ride.
3.  The risk of shared capitalist investments in one’s employer is manage-
able.
4.  Shared capitalism improves the performance of ﬁ  rms.
5.  Shared capitalism improves worker well-  being.
6.  Shared capitalism complements other labor policies and practices.
Hopefully the preceding chapters have convinced the reader that these are 
reasonable conclusions to reach from the evidence, despite the limitations 
inherent in nonexperimental science.
Taken together, these ﬁ  ndings create a picture of shared capitalism that 
is at odds with some common complaints about it. Economists have two 378    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Richard B. Freeman
major criticisms of shared capitalism: that free riding will undo any posi-
tive eﬀects of group incentives on eﬀort and performance, and that workers 
are generally risk-  averse and will be harmed by the ﬁ  nancial risk in shared 
capitalism plans.
Both free riding and ﬁ  nancial risk are real concerns. Free riding clearly 
exists: proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing appear to work best in small groups 
where the incentive to be a free rider is reduced, and some workers admit 
free riding oﬀ the eﬀorts of others in response to shirking co- workers (saying 
“some other employee will probably take action”)(chapter 2, this volume). 
And ﬁ  nancial risk is obviously a concern: some workers express a desire for 
lower ﬁ  xed pay over higher average pay that varies, and some prefer their 
next pay increase to be all ﬁ  xed pay with no proﬁ  t sharing, stock, or options 
(chapters 1 and 3).
The picture of shared capitalism in the book shows that free riding and 
ﬁ  nancial risk are surmountable concerns, and that broad-  based ﬁ  nancial 
participation can create a framework for cooperative corporate culture even 
in large groups or ﬁ  rms. The combination with a more cooperative corpo-
rate culture is what helps overcome free riding and create the performance 
beneﬁ  ts.
Our overall interpretation builds on the ideas of reciprocity and gift ex-
change, and the body of theory and research on bundles of high perfor-
mance work practices. There is increasing evidence that reciprocity plays 
a strong role in a wide range of economic and social relationships, helping 
encourage norms of cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Fehr and Gachter 2000; 
Gintis et al. 2005). Formal economic models also show how employment 
relationships can be built on reciprocity and gift exchange (Akerlof 1982).
A key element in our overall interpretation is that shared capitalism pay 
and wealth appears to generally come on top of standard pay and bene-
ﬁ  ts—that is, it represents “gravy” for the worker rather than substituting 
for other pay and beneﬁ  ts. This is consistent with the other studies on this 
question, several of which use administrative data and pre/  post designs on 
ﬁ  rms and individuals (Kim and Ouimet [2008]; Sesil et al. [2007]; Blasi, 
Conte, and Kruse [1996]; Kardas, Scharf, and Keogh [1998]; Kruse [1998]; 
Renaud, St-  Onge, and Magnan [2004]; and others reviewed in Handel and 
Gittleman [2004], and Kruse [1993, 113–  14]). If this is true, in the long run 
shared capitalism ﬁ  rms must be getting productivity increases, because there 
is no other way for a competitive ﬁ  rm to pay for the “gravy” aspects of the 
compensation package. The evidence presented here shows a number of per-
formance beneﬁ  ts, such as decreased turnover, increased loyalty, increased 
monitoring of shirkers, increased willingness to work harder for the ﬁ  rm, 
and increased investments in formal and informal training. This is consistent 
with eﬃciency wage theory in which higher compensation levels can essen-
tially pay for themselves through higher productivity. In particular, the gift 
exchange version of eﬃciency wage theory shows how ﬁ  rms can provide a Epilogue (and Prologue)    3 7 9
“gift” of high compensation that raises worker morale, and workers recipro-
cate with a “gift” of greater productivity (Akerlof 1982). The message sent 
by a “gift” of proﬁ  t sharing, stock, or options on top of regular pay and ben-
eﬁ  ts may be especially good for creating and reinforcing a sense of common 
interest and the value of a reciprocal relationship. In addition, the increased 
performance beneﬁ  ts are consistent with known evidence about the role of 
high performance work practices, which complement and strengthen the gift 
exchange. The lower supervision that is optimal under shared capitalism and 
such work practices may create an opportunity to save on supervisory costs, 
which itself increases productivity.
The higher compensation associated with shared capitalism helps address 
ﬁ  nancial risk concerns. Risk is obviously an important issue when variable 
pay (of any sort) is substituting for ﬁ  xed pay, and risk-  averse people will 
require a risk premium (higher average pay) to compensate for the added 
risk. We ﬁ  nd that the shared capitalism package generally includes more 
than enough compensation for the added risk associated with variable pay—
it provides gravy even after taking the extra risk into account, as shown 
by the reduced turnover intentions. Some ﬁ  rms combine lower risk forms 
of shared capitalism—such as proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing and stock 
options—with higher risk forms of shared capitalism—such as those based 
on buying company stock with worker savings. Even when shared capitalism 
is not gravy, portfolio theory suggests that shared capitalism can be part of a 
prudently- diversiﬁ  ed portfolio if properly managed (chapter 3, this volume). 
Having a separate diversiﬁ  ed retirement plan in addition to an employee 
ownership plan, being paid above market wages, and not funding employee 
stock ownership using worker savings, can all play a role in minimizing risk. 
So concerns over ﬁ  nancial risk can be overcome: it is striking that even the 
most risk-  averse workers are likely to prefer some shared capitalism in their 
pay (chapter 1, this volume).
The higher compensation may also help address the free rider problem. 
Workers may reciprocate the extra compensation from shared capitalism by 
wanting to “keep work standards high,” which was one of the most com-
mon reasons cited by shared capitalism employees for taking action against 
shirkers. Keeping standards high is part of the “gift” that workers give to 
ﬁ  rms in return for higher compensation, helping substitute for close supervi-
sion. Unlike a simple increase in ﬁ  xed pay, shared capitalism can also create 
norms for reciprocity among workers, since workers collectively will beneﬁ  t 
from higher performance (another common reason for taking action against 
shirkers is “poor performance will cost me and other employees in bonus 
or stock value”). The ﬁ  nding that close supervision is counterproductive 
when combined with shared capitalism is consistent with this interpreta-
tion—close supervision may send a mixed message that undermines the gift 
exchange understanding of the employment relationship.
The complementarity between shared capitalism and other human re-380    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Richard B. Freeman
source policies is an important part of our story. Overall these results show 
that shared capitalism can have positive eﬀects on workplace performance 
and worker outcomes, but one does not automatically get these eﬀects by 
simply installing a shared capitalism plan. The context matters greatly. The 
eﬀects are more likely and more pronounced when shared capitalism is 
extended to workers who are not closely supervised and who are covered 
by high performance policies like employee involvement and training. This 
makes sense: shared capitalism provides some ﬁ  nancial motivation, but this 
motivation will make little diﬀerence if workers do not have the opportuni-
ties and skills to improve workplace performance. High performance policies 
can provide these opportunities and skills, and help to create a more coopera-
tive gift- exchange culture in which workers share information and discourage 
free riding. One implication is that the beneﬁ  ts from adopting a high per-
formance policy like employee involvement or training will depend on what 
other policies are already in place, or are being adopted at the same time.
Such complementarity is strongly supported by recent research on how 
bundles of high performance work practices can reduce turnover, increase, 
productivity, and improve the stock market performance of ﬁ  rms. The idea is 
that the human resource policies and practices of the ﬁ  rm work better when 
they form a coherent whole; namely, when selection and recruitment, train-
ing, work organization, performance management, and reward systems are 
all pulling in the same direction and are integrated with the strategy of the 
ﬁ  rm. A signiﬁ  cant body of evidence and thought laying out this eﬀect now 
exists (see Huselid [1995]; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi [1997], Jackson 
and Schuler [1995]; Appelbaum et al. [2000]; and the meta- analysis in Combs 
et al. [2006]). This ﬁ  ts with a major theme of this book: that employees 
should not simply be provided shared capitalist incentives without a sup-
porting group of ﬁ  rm policies and practices to engage them in taking greater 
responsibility for the welfare of the ﬁ  rm. Throughout the studies included 
in this volume, we consistently see that bundles of human resource policies 
that support high performance play a strong complementary role together 
with shared capitalist practices. This ﬁ  nding cuts across the diﬀerent data 
sets, countries, and outcomes under study.
The broad spread of shared capitalism across industries and diﬀerent 
types of jobs is consistent with a gift-  exchange/  reciprocity and supportive 
corporate culture interpretation. If shared capitalism were implemented pri-
marily for one narrow purpose, such as to reduce turnover or to motivate 
creative activity that is hard to monitor, then its eﬀects would likely show up 
only in particular industries, ﬁ  rms, or jobs where it serves that purpose best. 
As shown in chapter 1, however, while the prevalence of shared capitalism 
varies by industry, with the highest level in the computer services industry, 
shared capitalism is well-  represented throughout the economy. This is not 
consistent with the notion that shared rewards will only work in particular 
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can be useful wherever workers have some discretion in how they do their 
jobs. Such discretion appears to be widespread—in fact, close to 85 percent 
of employees in the General Social Survey (GSS) report that it is very or 
somewhat true that they have a lot of freedom to decide how to do their 
work. This ﬁ  gure varies little by major industry or occupation, and is above 
80 percent even for blue-  collar workers. If one takes this at face value, 85 
percent of employees have a “gift” they can give to the company, by using 
their discretion in ways that can help the company. This gift can be given in 
reciprocal exchange for the higher compensation, training, employee par-
ticipation in decisions, job security, and other worker beneﬁ  ts that we have 
found to be part of the shared capitalism package. As long as employees 
have some discretion in how they do their jobs, such a gift exchange is a pos-
sibility. Viewed in this way, it is not surprising that ﬁ  rms across the economy 
have implemented shared capitalism, and that nearly half of all workers 
participate in some form of shared capitalism.
The ideas of gift exchange and reciprocity may also help to explain the 
high prevalence of shared capitalism plans in large ﬁ  rms. Viewed strictly 
from the perspective of the free rider problem, the higher prevalence of 
shared capitalism in large ﬁ  rms is a puzzle, since theory and evidence indi-
cate that the free rider problem is worse there than in small ﬁ  rms. The puzzle 
might be partly explained by the ﬁ  xed costs of setting up plans, which can 
be spread across a larger number of participants in large ﬁ  rms. But if the 
free rider problem is overwhelming in large ﬁ  rms, why set up shared capital-
ism plans at all? What good are they, even if the ﬁ  xed costs can be spread 
around? The answer seems to be that shared capitalism plans can help per-
formance even in very large companies. For example, a pre/ post comparison 
using productivity data and matched pairs of similar ﬁ  rms found signiﬁ  cant 
productivity increases among ﬁ  rms adopting proﬁ  t-  sharing plans that had 
more than 12,000 employees as well as among smaller ﬁ  rms (Kruse 1993). 
Such a result makes no sense from the perspective of the free rider problem 
(each worker gets only 1/  12,000th of the proﬁ  ts from his or her increased 
eﬀort), but can make sense if the workers are responding with reciprocity to 
a new plan that is perceived to be generous to workers. In eﬀect, it appears 
that shared capitalism and a complementary culture may allow large ﬁ  rms 
to function like smaller ﬁ  rms.
The idea of bundles of high performance work practices may also help to 
explain why employee perceptions of greater inﬂ  uence, lower levels of super-
vision, the presence of teams, and employer-  sponsored training are more 
common with some types of shared capitalism. (chapter 1). It would appear 
that some managers have found the right way to imbed shared capitalist 
practices into their organizational culture, or conversely, to alter that culture 
to complement shared capitalist modes of pay. When managers combine 
various forms of shared capitalism, as is common, they are also combining 
the work practices that are usual with each type of reward sharing. (It is 382    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Richard B. Freeman
nonetheless the case that simply observing what ﬁ  rms do does not necessar-
ily tell us what may be optimal.)
In sum, we think gift exchange/  reciprocity and high performance work 
practices play a large part in explaining the positive eﬀects of shared capital-
ism for both employers and workers. Workers seem to generally respond well 
to shared capitalism when it is perceived as coming on top of standard pay 
and beneﬁ  ts, and is connected to high performance policies such as employee 
involvement, training, and job security that gives workers extra skills, oppor-
tunities, and incentives for higher work standards. Close supervision, how-
ever, sends a contrary message that undercuts norms of reciprocity and the 
potential for better performance.
Two Scenarios of Shared Capitalism
Taken as a whole, the empirical results of this research suggests two sce-
narios of shared capitalism, one that is more likely to optimize its advantages 
for ﬁ  rms and workers and one that is less likely to do so.
One can characterize the more optimal shared capitalism as having these 
characteristics:
•    Fixed wages at or above the market rate.
•   Combinations of shared capitalism that balance more and less risky 
approaches and reduce wage substitution by avoiding ﬁ  nancing shared 
capitalism with worker savings.
•    Training, employee involvement in decision making, job security, and 
other complementary high performance work practices.
•    Low supervision of workers.
•   Prudent  diversiﬁ  cation of worker wealth.
•    Retirement plans in addition to shared capitalism to protect workers’ 
futures.
•   Higher than average grades on employee-  management relations and 
trust in management.
One can characterize the less optimal shared capitalism as having these char-
acteristics:
•    Pay below the market rate.
•   Combinations of shared capitalism that shift risk to workers by ﬁ  nanc-
ing shared capitalism with lower wages and out of worker savings.
•    Lack of complementary high performance work practices.
•    Close supervision of workers.
•   Imprudent  diversiﬁ  cation of worker wealth.
•   Lack of retirement plans in addition to shared capitalism to protect 
workers’ futures.
•   Lower than average grades on employee-  management relations and 
trust in management.Epilogue (and Prologue)    3 8 3
Implications for Social Science Analysis of Economic Behavior
As these studies show, shared capitalism directly engages several funda-
mental issues in economic theory. Many if not most economists will be 
surprised by the current wide prevalence of shared capitalism documented 
in the recent GSS surveys. The broad prevalence and variety in shared capi-
talism arrangements make it a promising area of study for testing and elabo-
rating existing theories, and developing new ones. Some of the fundamental 
issues involved in shared capitalism are:
•   Theory of the ﬁ  rm and principal- agent theory: Under what conditions is 
it eﬃcient for all proﬁ  ts to go to a central monitor (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972)? How does this depend on the informational content of monitor-
ing done by workers versus supervisors (Nalbantian 1987; Putterman 
and Skillman 1988)? In what ways might shared capitalism plans miti-
gate the myriad of principal- agent problems that exist throughout every 
organization? Can these plans work well only in companies where work-
ers have homogeneous interests (Hansmann 1996)? How do these plans 
aﬀect a range of investment, employment, and other issues debated in 
the traditional labor-  managed ﬁ  rm literature (Dow 2003)?
•   Residual control and residual returns: What does shared capitalism teach 
us about the broader issue of the beneﬁ  ts of matching residual con-
trol to residual returns, and how this should be done (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992)? Employee involvement without any gain sharing may 
be eﬃciency- destroying—for example, employees in employee involve-
ment plans may just make their jobs more comfortable (residual control 
without residual returns). Shared capitalism plans give some of the 
residual returns to a broad group of employees, which may be eﬃciency- 
enhancing only if these employees have signiﬁ  cant discretion (residual 
control) in how they do their jobs.
•    Risk aversion and portfolio theory: How can we learn from shared capi-
talism about how workers decide about alternatives involving risk and 
why and how this can aid or hurt their economic well-  being? While 
behavioral ﬁ  nance is being applied to people’s investments and other 
ﬁ  nancial decisions, shared capitalism provides an interesting setting in 
which to examine millions of workers who confront decisions about 
and experience reactions to employee stock ownership, proﬁ  t sharing, 
gain sharing, and broad-  based stock options in the American work-
place. The broad implications of behavioral decision theory for eco-
nomics has been addressed by Kahneman (2003). We have only begun 
to explore the many questions raised by this important literature. The 
wealth portfolios of these millions of shared capitalist workers also 
involve important issues of portfolio theory (Markowitz 1959). How 
does the ﬁ  nancial risk of shared capitalism ﬁ  t into portfolio theory, and 
how can and do workers respond to and manage that risk? How does the 384    Joseph R. Blasi, Douglas L. Kruse, and Richard B. Freeman
increased employment security with shared capitalism aﬀect the ﬁ  nan-
cial risk? How do combinations of low risk and high risk shared capital-
ism programs help employees and employers manage such risk? What 
is the role of forms of employee stock ownership that are not funded 
by employee savings (such as ESOPs and company stock matches) in 
reducing the high risk of company stock ownership? How can shared 
capitalist programs be better structured for workers who have high eco-
nomic insecurity?
•   Game theory and the free rider problem: How can cooperative solutions 
to the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” in game theory be established and main-
tained in market settings? What types of policies and relationships are 
needed?
•   Compensation  theories: How and when is shared capitalism a substi-
tute or complement to other compensation methods such as eﬃciency 
wages, implicit contracts, tournaments, bonding, and deferred wages, 
particularly when information about workers and the work process is 
imperfect and supervision is costly?
•    Strategic human resource management: Is the shared capitalism/ 
complementary work culture scenario an optimal combination for most 
ﬁ  rms? Or does this depend on the strategy that each ﬁ  rm has for satisfy-
ing customers and creating proﬁ  t? Are there ﬁ  rms where the potential 
positive eﬀects of the complementary scenario are outweighed simply 
by concentrating most of the rewards in a very small group of special 
employees? Or is there a role for shared capitalism that broadly includes 
all employees yet also diﬀerentially and richly rewards top performers? 
That is, can the beneﬁ  ts of shared capitalism and a complementary 
corporate culture be obtained where there is broad shared capitalism 
and large diﬀerentiation of rewards at the same time?
Shared capitalism also raises issues central to social sciences other than 
economics. In the ﬁ  eld of psychology, study of shared capitalism can also 
yield insights into the psychological contract between employees and em-
ployers, determining if and how employee attitudes and behavior are af-
fected (Rousseau and Shperling 2003). For sociologists, shared capitalism 
can provide lessons about the functioning and eﬀects of corporate culture, 
the eﬀects of diﬀerential versus shared rewards on the position of social 
groups within organizations and society, and whether the distribution of 
power, prestige, and rewards in social organizations are amenable to change 
that maintains eﬃciency of performance while reducing inequality. For po-
litical scientists, shared capitalism involves issues of social capital (Putnam 
2000) and the spillover eﬀects of workplace decision making on broader 
political participation and engagement (Pateman 1970; Mason 1982; Dahl 
1985). It raises questions of political economy and the design of public 
policy. For example, are there governmental and legislative levers that can Epilogue (and Prologue)    3 8 5
advance shared capitalism in a way that maximize its advantages to so-
ciety while minimizing its disadvantages, if that were a political goal of a 
society?
In sum, shared capitalism provides a rich opportunity for social scientists 
to address these and many other questions that touch on basic theories 
about how people live and work together. Our ﬁ  ndings and those of others 
working in this area show that shared capitalism has met the market test of 
surviving and prospering in a competitive economy that J. B. Clark posed 
for it over a century ago. There still remains much to be learned about this 
fascinating and important part of the capitalist world. We look forward 
to seeing future analyses of the shared capitalist story, using better data, 
more sophisticated econometrics, ﬁ  eld and lab experiments, and stronger 
theoretical models than those we have employed. We also look forward to 
learning more from ﬁ  rms about their experiences with this innovative form 
of arranging work and pay.
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